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The University of Iowa Libraries contain the papers of several 
Iowans who served in Congress during the era of the G reat D epres­
sion. Republicans Edw ard H. Campbell, Lester J. Dickinson, Benton 
F. Jensen, Karl M. LeCompte, F red  D. Letts, Christian William 
Ramseyer, and Thomas J. B. Robinson, along w ith Democrats F red­
erick L. Biermann, Edw ard C. Eicher, and Clyde L. Herring, have 
collections there. This article describes the role of Representative 
Christian William Ramseyer of Bloomfield, Iowa, in seeking enact­
ment of monetary-reform legislation in the 1931-32 period.1
Ramseyer was an influential m em ber of the Iowa congressional 
delegation. W ith the exception of House Agriculture Committee 
Chairman Gilbert N. H augen of Norwood, Ramseyer had  served 
longer in the House than any other congressman from Iowa. Born on 
a farm near Collinsville, Ohio, in March 1875, Ramseyer moved with 
bis family at age 12 to Davis County, Iowa, and settled near Pulaski. 
After attending public schools, he was graduated in 1897 from 
Southern Iowa Normal School and five years later from Iowa State 
Teachers College in Cedar Falls, Iowa. Ramseyer taught in Bloom­
field for nine years, eventually serving as principal of Bloomfield 
High School. In  1906 he earned a law degree from The University 
of Iowa and commenced a practice in Bloomfield. A Republican, he 
was prosecuting attorney of Davis County from 1911 to 1915 and 
was elected in 1914 to the U.S. House of Representatives. By 1932, 
Ramseyer was in his ninth congressional term  and a prestigious mem­
ber of the Ways and Means Committee. From a predominantly rural 
district, he often promoted legislation benefiting agriculture and 
small business.2
1  I am indebted to the National Endowment for the Humanities for financial 
assistance in the preparation of this article.
2  Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1971 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
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During H erbert Hoover’s presidency the nation’s economy had 
plunged. Between 1929 and 1933, the Gross National Product de­
clined from $103 billion to $55 billion and per capita income from 
$847 to  $442. Unemployment rose from 3 percent to over 25 percent 
of the total work force, encompassing around 12.6 million workers. 
Farmers especially experienced adverse conditions during the de­
pression. Although agricultural production did not drop significantly, 
farm income fell 61 percent from $13 billion to $5 billion.3 Corn had 
declined from $2 to 25 cents a bushel and hogs from $15 to $3 per 
hundredweight, w ith the result that Iowa farmers had considerable 
difficulty paying off debts. Farms were producing commodities that 
could not be disposed of, while many consumers lacked financial 
resources to  purchase these goods. Iowa farmers, many of whom were 
burning corn for fuel, advocated major monetary reform and par­
ticularly favored restoring the purchasing power of the dollar.
Ramseyer championed the cause of Iowa farmers demanding 
monetary reform. According to Ramseyer, economic difficulties were 
caused by (1 ) taxation and increased national and international 
debts following W orld W ar I and (2 ) the decline in commodity 
prices. In  order to enable farmers to pay their debts, he urged rais­
ing commodity prices to predepression levels and maintaining rates 
there. A moderate and controlled expansion of money and credit, 
Ramseyer argued, would restore the purchasing power of farmers 
and stimulate dem and for factory products.4
Ramseyer began his campaign for monetary reform as a member 
of the Iowa State Bar Association. In June 1930, the association ap­
pointed Ramseyer to chair a committee studying the purchasing 
power of money. Although fellow Republican Representatives Letts 
and Fred C. Gilchrist served on the committee, Ramseyer wrote the 
entire report which was issued in June 1931, by the committee at the 
Iowa State Bar Association’s annual convention in Des Moines. Gilchrist 
remarked, “Full credit must be given to him [Ramseyer] for the en­
tire report as I had nothing to do with it and neither did Judge Letts.” 
Ramseyer’s committee, protesting the high unemployment rates and 
decline in the purchasing power of money, considered stabilization 
of the currency of critical importance to Iowa, a largely agricultural 
state dependent on satisfactory price levels. “Many of her citizens,” 
Ramseyer’s committee stated, “are debtors, who suffer the tragic con­
3 David A. Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941, 2nd ed. (Bos­
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), pp. 131-35.
4 For Ramseyer’s views, see C. William Ramseyer Papers, The University of 
Iowa Libraries, Box 1, Correspondence 1931-1932.
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sequences when the price level declines.” Besides preventing infla­
tion and deflation, stabilization, it argued, would “prevent violent 
fluctuations in the price level.” The committee recommended that 
the gold value in the dollar be determ ined by the commodity price 
level.5
During the summer of 1931, Ramseyer corresponded with agricul­
tural journal editor Henry A. Wallace, Republican Congressman O. B. 
Burtness, and other farm experts on money problems. “The crop 
outlook here,” Ramseyer wrote Burtness on July 11 from Bloomfield, 
“is splendid. Of course, the big trouble is the price of farm commodi­
ties.” Two weeks later, Ramseyer commented to Burtness, “The more 
I reflect on our business and economic difficulties, the more I am 
impressed with the importance of setting up  a control on the pur­
chasing power of money.” By early August, he favored granting the 
Federal Reserve Board additional authority to stabilize the purchas­
ing power of money.6
Wallace, meanwhile, shared Ramseyer’s concern about monetary 
problems. The son of a secretary of agriculture under Presidents 
W arren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, he edited the widely circu­
lated and influential agricultural journal Wallaces’ Farmer. Wallace, 
an expert plant geneticist and authority on hybrid corn, corresponded 
frequently with Ramseyer and other members of the Iowa congres­
sional delegation. H e not only advocated raising commodity prices 
to predepression levels, bu t he also urged keeping agricultural rates 
at that level. Besides favoring greater federal intervention on behalf 
of the farmer, he proposed reducing the output of chronic surplus 
crops and increasing the prices paid to farmers.7
Between August and October 1931, Ramseyer served on the 
American Farm Bureau Federations Committee on the Stabilization 
of the Unit of Value.8 After several meetings in Chicago, the com­
mittee on October 9 and 10 urged Congress to pass a joint resolu­
tion authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to  restore wholesale 
commodity prices to the 1926 or 1929 predeflationary levels. The
5 “Report of the Committee on Stabilizing the Purchasing Power of Money,” 
June 18, 1931, Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1931; Fred C. Gilchrist to Rev. 
W. F. Clayburg, December 23, 1931, Henry A. Wallace Papers, The University 
of Iowa Libraries, Reel 11, Frames 390-91.
6 C. William Ramseyer to O. B. Burtness, July 11, 25, 1931, Ramseyer Papers, 
Box 1, Corr. 1931; C. William Ramseyer to John P. Wallace, August 4, 1931, 
Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1931.
7 For Wallace’s views on agricultural problems, see Wallace Papers, Reels 8, 
11, 13, 15; Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1931, 1932.
8 C. William Ramseyer to Henry A. Wallace, August 20, 1931, Wallace Papers, 
Reel 8, Frame 689.
http://ir.uiowa.edu/bai/vol34/iss1
[18]
Federal Reserve Board, the committee suggested, should not only 
regulate the volume of currency in circulation, bu t it should also 
determ ine the cost of money and the expansion and contraction of 
bank credit. According to  the committee, “nothing but an early and 
rapid increase in the wholesale commodity price level” could “save 
a large portion of the active producers.”
On October 19, Ramseyer delivered a major address on monetary 
reform to the Association of Commerce in Centerville, Iowa. Blaming 
agricultural problems on the decline in commodity prices rather than 
overproduction, Ramseyer insisted that rates be restored quickly to 
predepression levels. “W e,” he declared, “w ant an honest dollar. A 
stabilized dollar is an honest dollar.” Besides enabling farmers to pay 
debts and increase purchasing power, stabilization would help elim­
inate unemployment, maintain labor wage standards, and prevent 
many banks from collapsing. Ramseyer’s speech was greeted en­
thusiastically by Iowa businessmen, farmers, country bankers, and 
laborers.9
Ramseyer, meanwhile, ardently championed the American Farm 
Bureau Federation committee plan in constituent correspondence 
and with the Iowa congressional delegation. “The deflation of the 
last two years,” he warned one Iowan, “has resulted in many disas­
ters.” To another constituent, Ramseyer pleaded, “W e must do every­
thing possible to restore the commodity price level to w hat it was 
at the beginning of the present depression.”10 Ramseyer also enlisted 
considerable support from the Iowa congressional delegation for the 
plan. Representative Lloyd Thurston stated, “I am in hearty accord 
w ith the movement, if it can be confined to the products of the 
farm,” while Congressman Gilchrist remarked, “we will have found 
a remedy for many of our economic ills when we make the dollar 
more stable.”11 According to veteran Representative Haugen, “it 
would undoubtedly enable many now in dire distress to cancel their 
indebtedness, and thus give them  a new lease on life.”12
D uring November, Ramseyer returned to W ashington to confer 
w ith members of the Federal Reserve Board, legislative representa­
tives of farm organizations, and several congressmen. He received
9 C. William Ramseyer Speech, October 19, 1931, Centerville, Iowa, Ramseyer 
Papers, Box 2, Speeches.
10 C. William Ramseyer to John Cowles, October 6, 1931, Ramseyer Papers, 
Box 1, Corr. 1931; C. William Ramseyer to D. L. Akerman, October 27, 1931, 
Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1931.
11 Lloyd Thurston to Henry A. Wallace, January 9, 1932, Wallace Papers, 
Reel 11, Frames 634-35; Gilchrist to Clayburg, December 23, 1931.
12 Gilbert N. Haugen to O. T. Knudtson, January 11, 1932, Gilbert N. Haugen 
Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Box 37.
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little support for his agricultural plan from Eugene Meyer and two 
other members of the Federal Reserve Board. “I  didn’t  get m uch out 
of any of them,” Ramseyer commented. “In  fact I did  not expect to.” 
On the other hand, Ramseyer secured a m uch more favorable re­
sponse from congressmen, “all of whom seem to be deeply interested 
in w hat our committee is trying to accomplish.” Although not dis­
cussing the plan with all Iowa legislators, Ramseyer commented, 
“Those I have talked w ith are enthusiastic for it and undoubtedly 
others will line up  when the time comes.”13
At the same time, Ramseyer also concentrated on drawing up 
monetary legislation. At Ramseyer’s request, prom inent Yale Uni­
versity economist Irving Fisher wrote a com plicated bill changing 
the gold content of the dollar so as to restore a predepression price 
level and stabilize the purchasing power of the dollar. Ramseyer 
considered the Fisher proposal too cumbersome and detailed and 
complained that it delegated more power to executive agencies than 
Congress would accept. Consequently, on Decem ber 7, Ramseyer 
introduced a shorter, simpler measure designating the Federal Re­
serve Board to use all its existing authority to restore the price level 
to that of 1926 and to stabilize rates on tha t basis. Besides boasting 
that the legislation would “do more good than  anything else,” he pre­
dicted “such a bill will have a chance of being reported out.” Ram­
seyer’s measure did not grant the Federal Reserve System any addi­
tional power but was designed to make it more effective in regulating 
the volume of currency in circulation, the cost of money, and the ex­
pansion and contraction of credit. Ramseyer vowed, “W e are in the 
fight to win” and pledged, “I shall pu t forth all my energy to get an 
early consideration” of the measure.14 Several other representatives, 
including Burtness of North Dakota, T. Alan Goldsborough of M ary­
land, and James G. Strong of Kansas, also introduced similar agri­
cultural legislation.
On December 8, Ramseyer addressed the annual convention of the 
American Farm  Bureau Federation in Chicago. H e described the 
drop in commodity prices and the consequent decline in farm pur­
chasing power and stressed how his bill would remedy agricultural dis­
tress. Besides renewing appeals for “an honest dollar,” Ramseyer in­
sisted, “Nothing bu t an early and rapid increase in the wholesale com­
13C. William Ramseyer to Ralph Snyder, November 12, 1931, Ramseyer Pa­
pers, Box 1, Corr. 1931; C. William Ramseyer to Henry A. Wallace, November 
30, 1931, Wallace Papers, Reel 11, Frame 79.
14 Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 3 Sess., December 11, 1931, p. 494; Jan­
uary 11, 1932, p. 2,258; C. William Ramseyer to E. H. Sullivan, December 28, 
1931, Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1931; C. William Ramseyer to R. Brown, 
December 4, 1931, Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1931.
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modity price level can save a large portion of the active producers 
of the U nited States.” To secure “early and effective relief,” he con­
cluded, “we m ust have the united, militant, and organized support 
for the farm er of the U nited States.”15 The American Farm  Bureau 
Federation, along with the National Grange and the National Farm ­
ers Union, enthusiastically endorsed Ramseyer’s message, giving con­
siderable encouragement to the Iowa congressional delegation. Ram­
seyer asserted, “I believe with the united backing of the farm organ­
izations we can get action,” while colleague Gilchrist boasted, “Per­
haps this is the first time, thank the Lord, that all three of them 
agreed on any specific thing.”16
In  early January 1932, Ramseyer and other agrarian representatives 
intensified their campaign on Capitol Hill. On January 6, Ramseyer, 
joined by Burtness of North Dakota, Strong of Kansas, and Golds­
borough of Maryland, sent all House members a publication entitled 
“Honest Money.” Stabilization, they insisted, was “essential to permit 
debtors to retire their indebtedness, to safeguard the securities held 
by creditors including all financial institutions, and to restore gen­
eral prosperity to the country, as well as to prevent recurring periods 
of depression in the future.” Three days later, Ramseyer summoned 
around one hundred Congressmen to a conference at the Capitol to 
discuss monetary problems. At tha t session, the presidents of the Na­
tional Grange, National Farmers Union, and American Farm Bureau 
Federation jointly recommended raising and stabilizing the com­
modity price level. “W e demand,” they concluded, “the adoption of 
effective measures to stabilize the purchasing power of money.”17 Al­
though still facing a formidable task ahead, Ramseyer was determined 
to accomplish relief for distressed farmers. “I t  is the most important 
cause,” he remarked in the middle of January, “with which I have 
been identified during my entire service in Congress. This is the one 
task tha t lies at hand. I t is ‘do’ or ‘die.’ ” On the other hand, Ram­
seyer adm itted, “I t  has been an uphill business to arouse interest in 
the subject among members of Congress. . . . W e have had to do a 
lot of educating.”18
15 C. William Ramseyer Speech, December 8, 1931, Chicago, Illinois, Ram­
seyer Papers, Box 2, Speeches.
16 Ramseyer to Sullivan, December 28, 1931; Fred C. Gilchrist to Henry A. 
Wallace, December 23, 1931, Wallace Papers, Reel 11, Frames 387-89.
17 C. William Ramseyer et al., to House Members, January 6, 1932, Ram­
seyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1932; Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 3 Sess., Jan­
uary 19, 1932, p. 1932.
16 C. William Ramseyer to Chester H. Gray, January 18, 1933, Ramseyer 
Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1933-1942; C. William Ramseyer to H. B. Murray, March 
25, 1932, Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1932.
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On January 16, Ramseyer delivered a nationwide address over 
the NBC radio network on the “National Farm  and Home Hour.” 
After explaining Iowa’s agricultural problems and how his bill 
would remedy the situation, he fervently appealed to  farmers, la­
borers, businessmen, and bankers across the  nation to support in­
creasing commodity prices to predepression levels. “The sooner we 
realize that this is the only way out of our difficulties and get busy,” 
he stated, “the sooner we will begin to work out of this depression.” 
Besides stressing that the major national agricultural organizations 
wholeheartedly supported the legislation, he vowed that raising and 
stabilizing commodity prices would “restore purchasing power to the 
farmers, employ labor, revive business, save many banks,” and “make 
1932 as the year of economic recovery.”19
In late January, Ramseyer joined several other representatives 
launching efforts to secure Banking and Currency Committee hear­
ings on the monetary stabilization bills. A bipartisan group, including 
Burtness of North Dakota, Strong of Kansas, Goldsborough of M ary­
land, and Abe Sabath of Illinois, joined Ramseyer in coaxing the com­
mittee to conduct hearings. After these initial efforts failed, these 
representatives met on February 10 and pledged to start a campaign 
on the House floor for committee hearings. “There are at least a half 
dozen of us,” Ramseyer noted, “ready to speak on the floor of the 
House on monetary stabilization.” “Unless such hearings are forth­
coming very soon,” he warned, “we will have to commence with 
some strong arm methods.”20 Congress, however, was preoccupied 
with the comprehensive Reconstruction Finance Corporation bill and 
consequently delayed action on monetary stabilization. “As soon as 
it is safely out of the way,” Ramseyer wrote, “we will start on the 
stabilization bills.” At the same time, he was encouraged by the in­
creased bipartisan congressional interest in monetary reform. “There 
has been a great change,” he observed, “in the attitude of the mem­
bers of Congress. . . . Now I think we should press for a hearing at 
the earliest date possible, while some of the nonpartisan spirit still 
prevails.”21
To Ramseyer’s chagrin, the Banking and Currency Committee de­
layed hearings until March 16. Numerous witnesses, representing ag­
ricultural, economic, and business organizations and the Federal Re­
19 C. William Ramseyer, Speech, National Broadcasting Company, Washing­
ton, D.C., January 16, 1932, Ramseyer Papers, Box 2, Speeches.
20 C. William Ramseyer to Edward A. O’Neal, February 11, 1932, Ramseyer 
Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1932.
21 C. William Ramseyer to Henry A. Wallace, February 15, 22, 1932, Ram­
seyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1932.
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serve System, testified on the various monetary stabilization bills, 
further postponing any final committee action. Ramseyer had mixed 
emotions bu t was pleased that the committee was finally considering 
the monetary legislation. “Interest in the subject by the members of 
th a t committee,” he observed in late March, “has increased.” On the 
other hand, Ramseyer disliked the slow pace of committee action and 
was uncertain about the eventual congressional outcome. “We are 
making progress,” he wrote, “but I realize it is slow.” “I am hopeful,” 
he added, “that action on the monetary bills can be obtained in the 
near future. If w e do get the bill through the House there will still 
be a big fight ahead in the Senate.”22 A few days later, Ramseyer 
wrote one disenchanted constituent, “I am doing my very best to 
get action on this bill. I realize that conditions on the farms are in­
tolerable.”23
In  late April, the Banking and Currency Committee completed ac­
tion. After considering several similar bills, the committee reported 
out a measure (H R  10517) by Goldsborough of M aryland to restore 
commodity prices to  the 1926 basis and to stabilize rates at that level. 
The Goldsborough bill directed the Federal Reserve Board, the Fed­
eral Reserve banks, and the Secretary of the Treasury to restore the 
average commodity price to the same level that existed when farmers 
and other producers contracted their debts.24 Labeling the Golds­
borough bill as “a sound and constructive proposal,” Ramseyer 
pledged, “I  shall now exert my best efforts to get the bill passed by 
the House of Representatives a t the earliest possible date.”25
Ramseyer played an instrum ental role in the House adoption of 
the Goldsborough measure. D uring floor debate on May 2, he urged 
colleagues to back the Goldsborough bill elevating and stabilizing 
commodity prices. Unless Congress acted expeditiously, he warned, 
“the whole financial structure will collapse and everything will go 
to  pieces.” On the same day, the House approved the Goldsborough 
measure by a decisive 289-60 margin, w ith the Iowa delegation giving 
unanimous approval.26 After a long, uphill battle, Ramseyer and the 
other agricultural bloc members had accomplished their ultimate ob­
22 C. William Ramseyer to Henry A. Wallace, March 2, 1932, Wallace Papers, 
Reel 13, Frame 153; Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 3 Sess., March 12, 1932, 
p. 5,894; Ramseyer to Murray, March 25, 1932.
23 C. William Ramseyer to Mrs. Zilpha Goodson, April 4, 1932, Ramseyer Pa­
pers, Box 1, Corr. 1932.
24 Congressional Record, March 12, 1932, p. 5,894.
25 C. William Ramseyer to W. L. Brown, May 18, 1932, Ramseyer Papers, 
Box 1, Corr. 1932; C. William Ramseyer to Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence Ward, April 
22, 1932, Ramseyer Papers, Box 1, Corr. 1932.
26 Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 3 Sess., May 2, 1932, pp. 9,420, 9,432-33.
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jective in the House. “W hen the work was begun,” Ramseyer recalled, 
“there were not over twenty Congressmen who had given this sub­
ject any thought.”27
The Senate, to the dismay of the Iowa delegation, scaled down the 
monetary measure. Conservative Democrat Carter Glass of Virginia, 
who opposed granting the Federal Reserve Board such extensive 
power, introduced a rider to the home loan bill stipulating that fi­
nancial institutions issue nearly $1 billion in currency based on gov­
ernment bonds bearing 3.375 percent interest. The Senate approved 
the Glass rider, thus discarding the more comprehensive Goldsbor­
ough bill. Representative Gilchrist, expressing the sentiments of the 
Iowa delegation, charged that the Glass rider was “a flank attack” 
and “subterfuge” that “will not accomplish w hat we want.”28 
During the New Deal, Congress approved farm legislation more 
in accordance with Ramseyer’s objectives. The Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act of 1933 restricted acreage under production and paid those 
farmers limiting production substantial benefits based on parity. The 
legislation was designed to give farmers the same level of purchasing 
power as that in effect immediately before W orld W ar I, the most 
prosperous agricultural period in American history. Financed by a 
tax on the processors of agricultural commodities, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act stabilized farm prices and raised farm incomes sub­
stantially. In  1934 Congress established a $2 billion fund to stabilize 
the dollar in international exchanges, thus producing an inflationary 
effect desired by farmers.29
This monetary battle was the last major legislative campaign for 
Ramseyer in the House. Because of reapportionm ent caused by the 
1930 census, the Iowa House delegation was reduced from eleven to 
nine seats, forcing Republican incumbents Ramseyer and Thurston 
to run against each other. Thurston defeated Ramseyer in the 1932 
primary, bringing to an end the Bloomfield representative’s congres­
sional career. President H erbert Hoover in 1933 appointed Ramseyer 
a commissioner for the United States Court of Claims, a position
27 C. William Ramseyer to J. E. Cross, May 23, 1932, Ramseyer Papers, Box 
1, Corr. 1932.
28 Fred C. Gilchrist to Henry A. Wallace, August 6, 1932, Wallace Papers, 
Reel 15, Frame 459.
29 For the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, see William E. Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1963) and Van L. Perkins, Crisis in Agriculture: The Agricultural Adjustment 
Act and the New Deal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). For 
New Deal monetary legislation, see John A. Brennan, Stiver and the First New 
Deal (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1969) and David L. Porter, Congress 
and the Waning of the New Deal (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980).
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which he held until his death on November 1, 1943 in Washington, 
D.C.30
Ramseyer considered the drive for monetary legislation the most 
significant battle of his congressional career. Besides serving on the 
Iowa State Bar Association and American Farm Bureau Federation 
committees, he consulted with economists and agricultural organiza­
tions, drafted a monetary bill, organized congressional support for 
higher commodity prices, and delivered several speeches on behalf of 
monetary reform legislation. In addition, Ramseyer was instrumental 
in securing favorable action from the House Banking and Currency 
Committee and the representatives as a whole on the Goldsborough 
bill. Upon witnessing the deplorable agricultural conditions faced by 
Iowa farmers in the depression, Ramseyer proposed a simple yet ef­
fective way for enabling farmers to pay their debts.
30 Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1971 provides a 
sketch of Ramseyer’s political career. Francis O. Wilcox, “Congressional Redis­
tricting in Iowa," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, 29 (October 1931): 461- 
517, and Des Moines Register, November 2, 1932, discuss the impact of redis­
tricting.
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